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The judgment issued on September 2, 1998 by the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (hereinafter ICTR) finding Jean-Paul
Akayesu guilty on various charges of genocide and crimes against
humanity is likely to please those who have long struggled for the
progressive development and effective enforcement of international
criminal law.' This judgment, directed at the bourgmestre of the Taba
commune in the Prefecture of Gitarama in Rwanda, is the first international
conviction of an individual for genocide.2 Its symbolic significance is not
likely to be lost on international lawyers.
The Akayesu judgment makes a number of noteworthy determinations.
First, its crucial finding, that the killings of between one half and one
million people within Rwanda in the middle of 1994 were clearly aimed at
exterminating the group that was targeted and, given their undeniable scale
systematic nature and atrociousness, undoubtedly constitute genocide
within the traditional definition of that term as reflected in both the
Genocide Convention and the ICTR's statute should help to put an end to
debates in academic and policy circles on the nature of that massacre.
There have been some who have continued to assert that neither ethnic
cleansing in the Balkans nor the Rwandan killings of 1994 constitute
genocide because of the alleged intent of the perpetrators or because of the
identity of the victims targeted. Some have suggested, for example, that
since in both instances the perpetrators were primarily seeking to acquire
land occupied by others, neither the Tutsis nor Muslims (or other groups in
the Balkans) were ever really targeted for extermination. Others have
questioned whether the people killed in Rwanda in the middle of 1994,
namely Tutsis and Hutus regarded as sympathetic to them, were attacked
on the basis of ethnicity as opposed to their political beliefs. Yet others
* Mr. Alvarez is a Professor at the University of Michigan Law School; Visiting
Professor at Columbia Law School. For a more detailed presentation of some of the arguments
presented here, see the author's articles, Rush to Closure: Lessons of the Tadic Judgment, 96
MICH. L. REV. 2031 (1998) and Crimes of State/Crimes of Hate: Lessons from Rwanda
(forthcoming YALE J. INT'L L. (Summer 1999)).
1. See Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-T, Sept. 2, 1998 (carried on the
ICTR's web site at < www.un.org/ictr/english/judgement/akayesu.html >.
2. The term genocide did not appear in the Tribunal's judgment at Nuremberg for the
major Nazi defendants, although the prosecution made reference to the term during those
proceedings and in its indictments. The later trials, in Germany, of Nazi defendants included
charges of genocide. See, e.g., STEVEN RATNER AND JASON ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS ATROCITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 25 (1997).
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have suggested that, at least in the case of Rwanda, what occurred was a
double genocide for which both Tutsis and Hutus share equal
responsibility.
All of these contentions are explicitly or implicitly rejected in the
course of this judgment. Akayesu's judges have no trouble identifying
those aspects of the Rwandan massacre of 1994 that meet the requisite
specific intent required of genocide. The judges point to specific testimony
about the nature of the atrocities, including the killing of newborns and
pregnant women and the cutting of Achilles' tendons to prevent escape, as
evidence of the resolve of the perpetrators not to spare any Tutsi. Further,
the chamber adopts a strikingly modern definition of ethnic group that
accepts its constructed nature while acknowledging the power and potency
of ethnic self-identification. The judges quote approvingly, for example,
from the definition given by one expert witness, Alison Desforges, in
which she notes that the primary criterion for defining an ethnic group is
not a difference in appearance, language or culture but the sense of
belonging to that ethnic group, a sense that can shift over time as
definitions of relevant groups change over time. This malleable view of
ethnicity is likely to be attractive to those anxious to extend the scope of the
crime of genocide.
A second achievement relates to the preservation of collective
memory. Akayesu's judges render barbaric killings more comprehensible
(though no less horrible), thereby making it at least more likely that future
generations will learn from the mistakes of the past. While the factual
findings in the Akayesu judgment are not comparable in length or in level
of detail to the historical sections in the International Criminal Tribunals
for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) Tadic judgment,3 the judges still
manage to indicate, albeit briefly, the background facts necessary to
understand the 1994 genocide, including the origins of Tutsi/Hutu
distinctions. The judges suggest that ethnic distinctions in that country
were of recent, not ancient, lineage and can be traced to the legacy of
colonialism. The judges state that in the minds of European colonizers,
"the Tutsi looked more like them because of their height and color, and
were, therefore, more intelligent and better equipped to govern." 4 They
further indicate how Belgian colonial administrators helped to
institutionalize their racism by dividing the Rwandan population into three
"ethnic" groups and issuing mandatory identity cards containing their
holders' ethnic affiliation. Those seeking European complicity in the
events leading to genocide need look no further than the judges' description
of the historical context of the events in Rwanda in 1994. These early
sections in the judgment also puncture any illusion that the 1994 killings
3. See Opinion and Judgment, Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T (Trial
Chamber, ICTY, May 7, 1997) <www.un.org/icty/970507jt.htm>.
4. Id.
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were in any sense spontaneous. On the contrary, the judges state that the
genocide was meticulously organized and planned and included the
preparation of lists of Tutsi to be eliminated, the training of militiamen by
Rwandan Armed Forces, as well as a coordinated effort by Rwandan media
(particularly radio). The judgment presents a concise account of how the
killings were incited.
Third, the judges elaborate the controversial offense of incitement to
genocide. They find that incitement need not be direct but can be implicit.
They point out that a conviction can result from behavior that "plays
skillfully on mob psychology by casting suspicion on certain groups, by
insinuating that they were responsible for economic or other difficulties in
order to create an atmosphere favorable to the perpetration of the crime."'
Perhaps most significantly, the judges find that public incitement to commit
genocide can be punished even where such incitement was unsuccessful.
Drawing from the common law's notion of inchoate offenses, the Akayesu
judges find that the drafters of the Genocide Convention did not intend, by
omission, to suggest that unsuccessful incitement was not punishable. The
judges affirm that even incitement that fails to produce the results intended
by the perpetrator warrants punishment because of the high risks such
actions pose for society.
Fourth, the judges apply the evidentiary rules of the ICTR in a way
that responds to the difficulties presented by these cases from the
perspective of the prosecution. Doubtlessly aware of the challenges to
successful prosecutions posed by the wariness of witnesses to come
forward in situations that present little real prospect for effective witness
protection, the judges affirmatively reject the evidentiary rule, contained in
some civil law systems, requiring corroboration of evidence prior to its
admission. The judges state that they are not bound by such national rules.
Citing to their own procedural rules as well as the precedent established by
the ICTY's Tadic judgmet, the judges affirm their own ability to "freely
assess the probative value of all relevant evidence" even when such
evidence is presented only by a single witness.
Fifth, advocates of progressive development of international criminal
norms will also be pleased by the chamber's clear affirmation that the
ICTR's statute "does not establish a hierarchy of norms," but grants
jurisdiction over distinct offenses on equal footing. The judges therefore
find that the offenses of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes
each have different constituent elements and can lead to multiple
convictions even in relation to the same set of facts.
Sixth, the Akayesu judgment shows a sensitivity to gender-specific
violence that, to date, has been absent from previous international
judgments either at the end of World War II or more recently within the
ICTY. Critics of the Tadic trial's dismissal of the sole rape charge against
5. Id.
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that defendant, and of the handling of gender-specific international crimes
by the ICTY more generally, will be reassured by the judicial backing
given here to the ICTR's statute's provision indicating that genocide
includes "measures intended to prevent births within the group." The
Akayesu judgment affirms that such measures, specifically targeting
women as both members of an ethnic group and as women, can constitute
genocide. The Akayesu judges note that, "in patriarchal societies, where
membership of a group is determined by the identity of the father, an
example of a measure intended to prevent births within a group is the case
where, during rape, a woman of the said group is deliberately impregnated
by a man of another group, with the intent to have her give birth to a child
who will consequently not belong to its mother's group." 6 The judges
affirm that the facts underlying the Rwandan genocide indicate that sexual
violence was "a step in the process of destruction of the Tutsi group" and
that acts with the requisite genocidal intent "were committed solely against
Tutsi women, many of whom were subjected .to the worst public
humiliation, mutilated, and raped several times, often in public . ..and
often by more than one assailant."" The judges also indicate that
"measures intended to prevent births within the group"8 may be mental as
well as physical, noting that "rape can be a measure intended to prevent
births when the person raped refuses subsequently to procreate, in the same
way that members of a group can be led, through threats or trauma, not to
procreate. "9
The judges also affirm that mass rape can constitute a crime against
humanity. In this connection, the judges note that while there is "no
commonly accepted definition of rape in international law, it includes acts
used for such purposes as intimidation, degradation, humiliation,
discrimination, punishment, control or destruction of a person. The judges
define rape as a physical invasion of a sexual nature, committed on a
person under circumstances which are coercive. For this purpose, the
judges affirm that rape when inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the
consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an
official capacity constitutes torture.'" They specifically recognize that
sexual violence, including rape, when committed as part of a widespread or
systematic attack on a civilian population on a discriminatory basis
constitutes a crime against humanity." Indeed, Akayesu is found guilty of
6. See supra note 3.
7 Id.
8. Prosecutor Jean-Paul Akayesu ICTR-96-4-T, Sept. 2, 1998.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. More generally, the judges affirm that, as stated in article 3 of the ICTR's statute, a
prosecution for crimes against humanity requires proof of acts committed either in a widespread
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genocide and crimes against humanity in part due to his links to sexual
violence.
Seventh, even with respect to the charges against Akayesu that do not
result in convictions, namely those arising under the laws of war,12
progressive developers of international humanitarian law will nonetheless
be pleased by the judges' recognition that, at least ever since the Tokyo
trials, it has been well established that civilians may be held responsible for
violations of international humanitarian law.
As those familiar with the ineffectual history of international criminal
norms will attest, these judicial findings, rendered in the course of a real
international trial of a real perpetrator are significant achievements. The
Akayesu judgment, as the Tadic judgment by the ICTY before it, is a
valuable symbolic affirmation that international war crimes trials are
viable. Further, since Akayesu was functionally at least the equivalent of a
town mayor, his conviction, unlike Tadic's, shows that even relatively high
government officials can be held accountable. Under the circumstances it
is understandable if international lawyers see the Akayesu judgment as their
badge of honor, a testament to what has been achieved to make
international criminal law finally (if belatedly) effective. It is also all too
easy, given the dismal, and apparently worsening, state of affairs within
Rwanda reported by my fellow panelist, Madeline Morris, to draw another
related lesson as well: namely, that it is futile to expect countries that have
been involved in mass atrocities to themselves make credible efforts at
providing criminal accountability. Given the successful and progressive
precedents being established by the ad hoc criminal tribunals, including the
ICTR, as compared to the struggles with Rwandan national prosecutions
and plea bargained guilty pleas, it is all too tempting to conclude that
international criminal prosecutions are invariably superior to national
attempts since the latter are only too apt to compromise either with respect
to the rights of victims, as in the case of the Former Yugoslavia, or the
rights of alleged perpetrators, as in the case of Rwanda. International trials
are likely to be regarded as less destablizing to fragile governments, less
likely to cede to the short term objectives of national politics, more likely
to have the expertise of better qualified jurists of an international stature
better able to progressively develop the law in a uniform fashion, more
impartial than proceedings conducted by those caught up in the milieu that
fashion or systematically. Such crimes do not require evidence that acts of violence were both
widespread and systematic.
12. Akayesu is found not guilty on these charges due to lack of what the chamber calls
"factual" evidence showing a sufficient link between his actions as bourgmestre and the actions of
those conducting the underlying armed conflict in Rwanda in 1994. It is unclear why the judges
failed to find such a link based on the presented evidence.
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gave rise to the atrocities, and better able to investigate crimes with
interstate dimensions. '
3
It is all too easy to conclude that international criminal accountability
is best able to fulfill our Nuremberg-inspired goals -- that is, preserve
collective memory, vindicate and respond to the needs of victims, affirm
the national and international rule of law, and promote national
reconciliation. While drawing such a sanguine lesson from the operation
of the ICTR to date would be a grave mistake, there is some evidence that
the international legal community may indeed be making that mistake.
There is a risk that the international community may become engaged in a
two track approach: (1) an emphasis on and preference for international
venues; and (2) benign neglect for domestic approaches.' 4  This is
suggested by the criteria by which some international lawyers propose to
judge domestic criminal prosecutions. Thus, in a recent, well received
book, Steven Ratner and Jason Abrams argue that local criminal
prosecutions will yield benefits only if there is, at the national level:
[a] workable legal framework through well-crafted statutes of
criminal law and procedure; a trained cadre of judges,
prosecutors, defenders and investigators; adequate infrastructure,
such as courtroom facilities, investigative offices, record-keeping
capabilities, and detention and prison facilities; and, most
important, a culture of respect for the fairness and impartiality of
the process and the rights of the accused. '
5
This is essentially a recipe for preferring, in the wake of virtually every
instance of mass atrocity, international venues for prosecution. It is
difficult to imagine what country, in the immediate aftermath of mass
atrocities, could fulfill, for example, Ratner and Abrams' expectations for
a desirable legal culture. It would appear that the first victim of atrocity is
precisely the culture of respect for the rights of the accused that they find
so important. Acceptance of the Ratner/Abrams premises is reflected in
the jurisdictional primacy enjoyed by the ICTY and ICTR over national
courts. '
6
13. For arguments along these lines, see, e.g., Antonio Cassese, Reflections on
International Criminal Justice, 61 MOD. L. REv. 1 (1998).
14. Consider in this regard the abundance of law review articles addressing the
international ad hoc tribunals compared to the relative paucity of pieces addressing the local
Ethiopian or Rwandan prosecutions. Indeed, as is suggested by the case of Rwanda, there is some
question about how "benign" the neglect of domestic venues has been. Still, at the level of
rhetoric at least international lawyers have not condemned out of hand national prosecutions and
usually stress the need to encourage them.
15. RATNER AND ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ATROCITIES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 159 (1997).
16. See, e.g., art. 8 of the ICTR's Statute.
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Further, the Ratner and Abrams' recipe for preferring international
venues over domestic ones could prevail even with respect to the
"complementarity" contained in the new treaty for a proposed permanent
international criminal court (hereinafter ICC). The Rome treaty's recipe
for permitting an international prosecution, when national authorities are
"unwilling" or "unable" to do so,17 could lead to a preference for
international venues in situations like those in Rwanda -- where, in the
immediate wake of mass atrocities, local investigations or trials are simply
not possible not because of lack of political will by the new government,
but due to very real and serious resource constraints. While much will
depend on the discretion exercised by the ICC'S prosecutor (and its
judges), the ICC's proposed "complimentary" jurisdiction could become,
in the worst case scenario, a race to the courthouse between international
and domestic prosecutors, with the first to emerge with a plausible criminal
investigation precluding retrial by the other. As my fellow panelist here,
Professor Morris, argues, such contests of concurrent jurisdiction could
produce destructive anomalies of inversion that is, serious perceptions of
injustice if, for example, higher level perpetrators secure fairer and kinder
treatment before international bodies as compared to those guilty of lesser
crimes who receive expedited justice (and perhaps the death penalty) in
national courts.18 At best, the proposed ICC suggests the international
lawyer's willingness to leave the issue of international support for domestic
venues to another day. It reflects the notion that domestic venues for
accountability, whether in states that have suffered the atrocities or third
states, need to be factored into our schemes only to the extent no
international alternatives exist or because local courts are closer to where
the evidence and witnesses are located, but not because local approaches
might afford preferable methods for achieving our grand goals, including
national reconciliation. The contemplated operation of the ICC does not
envision that national venues may need to be affirmatively encouraged and
supported by international proceedings or that strengthening local methods
for accountability may be, at least in cases like Rwanda, the more
important task.
As with the ad hoc tribunals now in place, there are no provisions in
the ICC treaty (at least not yet) for joint investigations between national
and international prosecutors or for the international prosecutor's turning
over cases or investigations to domestic processes once these emerge. As
appears to have occurred with respect to Rwanda, there is a risk that scarce
international resources could well be diverted in the future to the new
international court rather than to restoring the credibility of national judicial
17. See arts. 17-19, Rome Statute.
18. Also, as Professor Morris indicates, less severe international sentences may also
undermine local attempts to convince perpetrators to plead guilty to lesser offenses in order to
escape more severe punishment -- as appears may now be occurring with respect to Rwanda.
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institutions. As with respect to the ICTR, the new ICC is not seen as
needing to be complimentary in this sense to domestic venues. The latter
are seen as mere concessions to real politik. There is nothing in the ICC's
treaty, and little in the underlying legal literature, that suggests thoughtful
discussion of how local criminal trials, reflective of local community
sentiments, significantly enhance the prospects for preserving collective
memory, vindicating victims, and affirming the national and the
international rule of law. Further, there has been relatively little attention
paid to what "accountability" can mean in cases like Rwanda involving
thousands if not millions of perpetrators where individual trials for all those
accused are impossible at either the national or international levels. 9
The lesson we should be drawing from Rwanda is that attention to
domestic processes, from Rwanda-styled plea bargains to South Africa-
styled truth commissions, and to making international venues compatible
with these are vital to the prospects for restoring the rule of law where it
matters most: that is within communities and nations devastated by mass
atrocities. Encouragement of and sensitivity to grass roots efforts when
these are consistent with making perpetrators accountable confers a sense
of legitimacy to both international and domestic efforts. The prospects for
national reconciliation would appear to be enhanced to the extent those who
are to be reconciled are accorded a sense of ownership in the process. As
the Tokyo trials should have taught us, top-down "foreign" efforts are less
likely to leave a lasting imprint on the societies international elites hope to
influence.
To Rwandans it seems to matter a great deal whether an alleged
perpetrator of mass atrocity is paraded before the local press, judged in a
local courtroom, subjected to local procedures (with all its attendant
imperfections), and given a sentence that accords with local sentiments,
including the death penalty. 2° This should not surprise as any Oklahoman
19. For rare counter-examples, see Neil J. Kritz, Coming to Terms with Atrocites: A
Review of Accountability Mechanisms for Mass Violations of Human Rights, 59 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 127; Madeline H. Morris, International Guidelines Against Impunity:
facilitating Accountability, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 29.
20. The result of the ICTR's jurisdictional primacy, together with the protection against a
second trial, is that Rwanda is barred, by Security Council fiat, from imposing the death penalty
on the most culpable perpetrators of genocide, at least to the extent these are tried by the ICTR.
This highly exceptional imposition of the international community's will, seen by human rights
advocates as a significant step towards the abolition of the death penalty, is the source of
considerable tension within Rwanda. Unlike some European states, Rwandan authorities have
never consented to any independent treaty restricting the imposition of the death penalty and
Rwanda's Organic Law for the handling of these crimes specifically reserves the right to impose
death on the most serious offenses and, to date, over thirty such executions have taken place. See
Organic Law No. 08/96 of Aug. 30, 1996 on the Organization of the Prosectuions for Offenses
Constituting the Crime of Genocide or Crimes Against Humanity Committed Since Oct. 1, 1990
<http.//www.rwandemb.org/prosecution/law.htm>.
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will tell you if asked whether Timothy McVeigh should have faced a trial
abroad for terrorism instead of one in the United States. Given a choice
between local and foreign justice (as in a trial in Tanzania under unfamiliar
processes and judges), it should hardly surprise if most survivors of the
Rwandan genocide prefer local trials or local plea bargains, especially
where it appears that national venues may produce quicker results. The
place where trials are conducted, as well as who conducts them, has
consequences, particularly to the prospects for the restoration of faith in
credible local legal institutions.
Despite its numerous achievements with respect to the progressive
development of the law, the Akayesu judgment itself suggests some of the
hazards presented by international processes for criminal accountability.
The length of the Akayesu proceedings is a problem. Akayesu was indicted
on Feb. 13, 1996 and a verdict was issued against him more than two years
later. The undue length of these proceedings was not caused by the case's
complexity but by numerous delays caused by the defense; there are
inefficiencies built into the ICTR's operation that go beyond the well-
known difficulties relating to its establishment. Such a lengthy trial not
only exacerbates the differences between such interfiational trials and
expedited proceedings or plea bargains within Rwandan but also presents a
challenge to those who would draw public attention to international trials.
It is difficult to use such proceedings to send messages of deterrence or
messages of reconciliation to victims of mass atrocities if no one hears
about the trials or if media outlets devote their short attention spans to other
matters. Moreover, it is not at all clear that the most important audiences
for such messages, namely those who have suffered the consequences of
the Rwandan genocide or remain incarcerated within Rwanda, have much
access to the media coverage of such international trials that manages to
occur. The evidence is all to the contrary: in a country with as high an
illiteracy as Rwanda's, it should scarcely surprise us that most Rwandan
get their news from local radio emphasizing local events. Thus, even
critics of Rwandan local prosecutions admit that such trials have received
far more extensive local coverage than have events in distant Arusha
involving the ICTR.2'
Although international lawyers have reserved their harshest criticism
for local Rwandan prosecutions, ICTR proceedings present difficulties of
their own which should not be underestimated. As we have just heard
from Professor Morris, the international legal specialists within the ICTR
are not adept at criminal law and the judges are getting national law wrong.
This is a matter of enormous potential significance to the legitimacy of
21. Thus, the July 1997 report of the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights reports that
one of the best public education campaigns was the live radio broadcast of the trial of Froduald
Karimara, a trial conducted inside Rwanda which drew massive crowds to the local courtroom.
Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Prosecuting Genocide in Rwanda: The ICTR and National
Trials at 64 (July 1997).
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ICTR verdicts. On a number of crucial issues, including the propriety of
multiple convictions or the meaning of complicity, the gaps in international
legal norms make recourse to national law inevitable. International lawyers
need to be concerned about how progressive gap-filling occurs and about
whether those expert in international law are necessarily best able to do it.
We should also be concerned about the number of gaps that are now being
filled by judges in the course of their decisions. The criticisms of
Nuremberg for imposing ex post facto criminal liability should have taught
us to be leery about relying on judicial innovations in the course of
applying them. The downside of many of the developments identified
above are precisely that they might be perceived to constitute progressive
development (lex ferenda) instead of the application of well-established
legal norms (lex lata). There are, in addition, a number of places in the
judgment that present troubling (if predictable) issues of cultural
misunderstanding or linguistic difficulties. These are difficult to avoid
when foreign judges need to have recourse to translators and cultural
experts in order to determine, for example, whether a witness understands
the difference between reporting something as an eyewitness and presenting
a second-hand account or whether perpetrators truly understood that they
were meant to go out and kill those who were portrayed as their ethnic
enemies. Despite the substantial improvement made with respect to the
rights of defendants since the days of Nuremberg, the Akayesu judgment
shows that the ad hoc tribunals remain vulnerable to fairness critiques for
both defendants and victims.
Above all, international lawyers need to bear in mind that the primary
benefit of the Akayesu judgment, and of the ICTR generally, remains
symbolic. The realities are stark. While the ICTR will be fortunate, at the
end of the day, to conduct trials for more than a few dozen perpetrators, at
this writing approximately 135,000 Rwandans remain in detention in local
jails, about one percent of the entire population. Plainly, the ICTR has not
yet had a beneficial effect on the restoration of the rule of law within
Rwanda or on the prospects for national reconciliation.' International
lawyers should not pat themselves on the back for establishing a process
that manages to ignore the needs of the vast number of defendants or of
survivors of that genocide. We should not congratulate ourselves for
creating international processes that have left a devastated Rwanda to
handle the vast bulk of perpetrators or risk a renewed bloodbath if
detainees are summarily released. Although international lawyers may be
justifiably proud of the advances made with respect to the due process
rights now accorded defendants before international courts (as compared to
Nuremberg), we should not lose sight of the fact that the ICTR does
nothing for the vast majority of those detained in Rwanda in horrendous
22. Indeed, as Professor Morris has suggested on this panel previously the ICTR's effect
on the effectiveness of the plea bargain process within Rwanda has probably been negative.
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conditions. Only a minuscule proportion of Rwandan perpetrators are
likely to see the inside of an international courtroom and the international
process has done nothing for their due process rights. These facts make the
international community's critiques of Rwandan proceedings to date seem
hollow and hypocritical. While Rwandan plea bargains are doubtless a
flawed alternative, some kind of expedited arrangement designed to avoid
individualized trials for the vast majority of perpetrators would appear to
be inevitable under the circumstances. It is unimaginable how even rich
nations could provide individual trials for one percent of their own
populations. While we may be disappointed that the Rwandan plea
bargained arrangements have fallen far short of expectations, the number
of domestic trials conducted to date (over 300) and of guilty verdicts
accepted and awaiting processing (some 8,000) is undeniably impressive
for a country that less than four years ago had sixteen lawyers left alive.
Three hundred trials, even trials ranging from two to three days in length,
are still 299 more trials than the international community has managed to
conclude in four years within the ICTR. Before we condemn Rwandan
authorities for the serious lapses in due process or for the slow pace of
local proceedings,' the international community needs to accept its own
share of responsibility for the inadequacies of Rwandan processes. It is the
international community, after all, that has failed to prevent on-going
incursions into Rwandan territory by Hutus bent on continuing their
unfinished genocide and we need to consider to what extent the
continuation of violence has exacerbated tensions between factions within
Rwanda and encouraged retaliatory acts by Rwandan authorities. As we
have just heard from Professor Morris, ethnic tensions are on the rise
within Rwanda, amidst continuing suspicions of the international
community and its intentions within the ICTR. While it may be true that
the willingness to deal fairly with the accused may be withering away
within Rwanda, we should be leery of simple-minded attempts to point the
finger solely at the Rwandan authorities. Attempts to conduct criminal
proceedings amidst on-going violence are bound to be severely
compromised.
Drawing lessons from the Akayesu judgment and from the case of
Rwanda is a treacherous business precisely because the likely lessons
depend on the time horizon. Through at least 1996, there was a serious
prospect that the new Rwandan government that took control in the wake of
the 1994 genocide would undertake a serious and even-handed effort to
conduct fair trials for those accused of mass violence, including of Tutsis
accused of violent retaliation. For the most part, the international
community failed to support such efforts and devoted most of its attention
and resources, now reaching between $40 and $50 million a year, to
establishing and operating an international tribunal with primacy over
23. See, e.g., Lawyers Committee Report, supra note 21 at 67.
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national proceedings. The international community took a cookie-cutter
approach to the ICTR, establishing an entity that was essentially a weaker,
more impoverished replica of the tribunal established for the former
Yugoslavia a year earlier. It took this approach, including provision for
jurisdictional primacy, despite the fact that the situations with respect to the
two regions were vastly different. In the former Yugoslavia there was little
prospect for serious or even-handed local prosecutions while the same
cannot be said once the government changed hands in Rwanda in the
middle of 1994. At that time the local governmental authorities were only
too willing to prosecute and could have used extensive international
assistance to make such efforts more credible.
The challenges facing the international community at the end of the
Rwandan genocide in 1994 were vastly different from what it faced with
respect to the former Yugoslavia. With respect to Rwanda the challenge
was to help fashion processes for criminal accountability that would take
into account the vast number of likely defendants, the necessity of
complimenting and not undermining local approaches, and the need to
convince Rwandan authorities that the international community that failed
to act to prevent the 1994 genocide could now be counted upon to prevent
on-going violence. The international community failed on all three counts
and the ICTR threatens to become, for these reasons (and not merely due
to well-publicized inefficiencies or fiscal improprieties), an embarrassing
failure. In my view, the international community has been more cognizant
of internationalist priorities than of the needs of people who in the case of
Rwanda continue to suffer egregious atrocities. In fashioning an
exclusively international process for criminal accountability, international
lawyers failed in this case to consider to whom accountability is ultimately
owed.
